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With the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision fZelman v. Simmons-Harris,
2002), upholding the vouchers portion of an Ohio-based scholarship pro-
gram, interest in vouchers is at an all-time high. Will the availability of
voucher programs create an exodus of students from public schools? Will
private schools open their doors and classrooms to respond to the increas-
ing need? Several problems remain before voucher programs can become
widespread, and even then some private and religious schools may opt not
to participate. This article discusses the autonomy of religious schools,
summarizes relevant court cases, and explores three possible reasons some
private and religious schools may not be willing to accept vouchers.
The Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002),upholding the vouchers portion of the Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship
Program, has brought some closure to the longstanding debate regarding the
efficacy of vouchers (Moe, 2001). The Court ruled that Ohio's plan, which
provides vouchers for parents of students in the Cleveland public schools to
be used at a number of educational options, including religious schools,
passed constitutional muster under the Establishment Clause. Although the
Court did not find a constitutional infirmity with Ohio's plan authorizing the
use of vouchers for religious schools, it neither required nor endorsed vouch-
ers. If vouchers are to expand beyond the two states that currently permit
them for religious schools, Ohio and Wisconsin {Jackson v. Benson, 1998),
legislatures must be the bodies to make the decisions. Hence, decisions to
implement voucher plans will be political ones.
Beyond the political realm, vouchers are likely to face challenges under
state constitutions. For example, in Holmes v. Bush (2002), a state trial court
in Florida struck down a voucher plan under a state constitutional provision
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prohibiting the taking of any "money from the state treasury to use directly
or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of
any sectarian institution" {Ela. Constitution, 2002). The court based its judg-
ment on the fact that the vast majority of students taking part in the voucher
program attended religious schools.
Thirty-six other states have similar constitutional provisions, sometimes
referred to as Blaine amendments, named for Senator James Blaine who
unsuccessfully sought, in the 1870s, to amend the Constitution to prohibit
public funding for nonpublic religious schools (Kirkpatrick, 2002). These
amendments originated in 19th-century anti-Catholicism flowing from the
widespread establishment of Catholic schools in response to the largely
Protestant-flavored public schools, and were designed to deny public funds
from being used for Catholic schools.
Whether Blaine amendments or state statutes with similar content can
withstand constitutional scrutiny remains to be seen. For example, in Davey
V. Locke (2002), a divided Ninth Circuit invalidated a statute from
Washington State (Wash. Rev. Code, 2002) that prohibited the granting of
state aid for students pursuing theology programs. The majority in Davey was
of the opinion that the state law depriving the student of funding available to
other students for nonreligious programs violated the Free Exercise Clause in
the First Amendment. Although Davey did not reach the validity of
Washington's Blaine-type state constitutional amendment, the case suggests
that the legal battles regarding vouchers are complex and far from over.
Even if vouchers are legal under state law, not all religious schools may
choose to participate. Thus, the purpose of this article is to discuss why some
religious schools may choose not to participate in voucher programs.
PARENT EXPECTATIONS AND
THEIR CHILDREN'S EDUCATION
Vouchers represent an opportunity for parents with limited income to select
altemative educational settings for their children. Lacking adequate financial
resources, poorer parents are disenfranchised from the selection process
available to their more affluent peers. Even though the Supreme Court has
upheld a state tax deduction for tuition, transportation, or book expenses
incurred with sending a child to school {Mueller v. Allen, 1983), such a pro-
gram is of no benefit to parents who lack funds to pay for the first year's
costs. Vouchers provide up-front money that can pay for tuition.
The Cleveland voucher program that is more fully discussed in another
article in this issue provides a maximum of $2,250 for parents to use for
tuition at private, including religious, schools, as well as at public schools in
districts contiguous to Cleveland. Aware of the fact that the majority of stu-
dents in Cleveland are from low-income and minority families. Justice
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Thomas observed in his concurring opinion in Zelman, that "the failure to
provide education to poor urban children perpetuates a vicious cycle of
poverty, dependence, criminality and alienation that continues for the remain-
der of their lives" (pp. 2483-2484). Parents with access to vouchers clearly
have the ability to make educational choices for their children that they had
not had before.
The notion that parents can direct the education of their children has long
been afforded constitutional protection. In Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), for the
first time, the Supreme Court recognized that parental direction of the educa-
tion of their children is a right protected by the liberty clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Meyer, when the State of Nebraska required all
instruction to be in English, a teacher was charged with a misdemeanor for
teaching Bible stories in German. In invalidating the state statute, the Court
found that a teacher's right to teach was a derivative "of parents to engage
him so to instruct their children" (Meyer, 1923, p. 400). Two years later, in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925), the Court struck down an Oregon statute
that required all students to attend public schools. In declaring that "the child
is not the mere creature of the State," the Court reasoned that the right of non-
public schools to exist was a right derivative of "[the parents] who nurture
him and direct his destiny" (p. 535). Two years after Pierce, the Court, in
Farrington v. Tokiishigue (1927), invalidated a statute in Hawaii that severe-
ly restricted the ability of children of foreign ancestry to participate in lan-
guage schools off school premises and not held during the school day. As in
Meyer and Pierce, the Court held that the right of children to attend these
schools depended on "the right of [the Japanese parent] to direct the educa-
tion of his own child without unreasonable restriction" (Farrington, p. 298).
Finally, in Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972), the Court held that Amish children
did not have to attend school past the eighth grade, despite a state statute
requiring attendance until age 16. Attendance at a public high school until
age 16 threatened the existence of the Amish religious community because it
intruded unreasonably upon the parents' duty to inculcate "moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship" (p. 233). Wisconsin v.
Yoder represents the high-water mark of parents' rights to direct their chil-
dren's education. None of the four cases discussed involved parents and pub-
lic schools. As would become clear, the right of parents to make educational
decisions for their children did not apply to the public schools.
PARENT RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Parental attempts to effect changes in the public schools on behalf of their
children have consistently met with lack of success. In Mozert v. Hawkins
(1987), a parent requested an altemative reading series because the one
adopted for her child contained content objectionable based on religious
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beliefs. The Sixth Circuit upheld a school board policy that prohibited
accommodation of such parent requests. An accommodation would amount to
an advancing of religious beliefs in violation of the First Amendment's estab-
lishment of religion. Eight years later, in Settle v. Dickson County (1995), the
Sixth Circuit again revisited the issue with a similar result. The court decid-
ed that a teacher could refuse to permit a student to write a biography on
Jesus Christ, even though the teacher was in error on both her application of
the class assignment requirements to the student's topic and her understand-
ing of the law regarding religion and public schools. In Brown v. Hot, Sexy
and Safer (1995), the First Circuit refused to permit parents to sue school
officials even though they violated board policy by failing to send parent con-
sent forms home. As a result, parents had no legal recourse when their chil-
dren were required to attend a graphically vivid sexual presentation. Finally,
in C.H. V. Oliva (2000), the Third Circuit found no free speech violation when
a kindergartner's drawing of Jesus Christ was removed from display in a
school hallway and then replaced in a less prominent position.
These cases indicating the absence of enforceable parental rights in pub-
lic schools occurred against a backdrop of the Supreme Court's systematic
excision of religion from the public schools. Beginning with Fngle v. Vitale
(1962) and School District of Ahington Township v. Schempp (1963), the
Court removed prayer and Bible reading from the schools. This theme was
repeated three decades later when the Court struck down prayer at graduation
in Lee v. Weisman (1992), followed 8 years later when the Court invalidated
prayer before football games in Sante Fe Independent School District v. Doe
(2000). Earlier, the Court struck down a state effort to require public school
boards to provide a balanced treatment in teaching evolution by also requir-
ing the teaching of creation science {Edwards v. Aguillard, 1987).
A common theme among these cases involving parental rights was the
Court's refusal to pemiit practices even though there was majority support at
the local and/or state levels and no student would have been coerced into par-
ticipating. The notion that board-member- or state-legislator-expressed sup-
port for prayer or teaching creationism could be the basis for invalidating
such practices served notice that a person's religious motives were suspect
under the Establishment Clause.
Although none of the prayer or creationism cases turned on the issue of
parent rights, they did reflect a change by a majority of the Supreme Court as
to the place and prominence of religion in public schools. This change was
not supported by all members of the Court as reflected by Chief Justice
Rehnquist's acerbic remark in his dissent in Santa Fe that "the [majority's]
opinion...bristles with hostility to all things religious in public life" (2000, p.
318). Not surprisingly, Rehnquist's sentiment resonates with parents who are
disaffected with the public schools and are looking for altemative venues for
their children's instruction.
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THE AUTONOMY OE RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
Beginning in the mid-1970s, the demand for religious schools increased sig-
nificantly. Protestant churches, especially evangelical ones, struggled to keep
pace with the demand by starting new schools even as the number of Catholic
schools declined. While the largest number of religious schools continue to
be Roman Catholic, a significant number of evangelical Protestant churches
have expanded their ministries to include K-12 education (James & Levin,
1988).
The role of parents in today's religious schools differs dramatically from
the heady days of Meyer and Pierce when the functioning, and even exis-
tence, of such schools depended on the constitutional right of parents to
direct the education of their children. In this new round of litigation, states
have treated religious schools as separate legal entities with their own rights
and responsibilities. The significance of such a change becomes evident when
these schools are faced with the opportunity to participate in voucher pro-
grams.
Yet, before vouchers ever came onto the educational scene religious
schools faced prolonged and bitter conflict with state efforts to control their
activities. If states could not legislate religious schools out of existence, as
was addressed in Pierce, could they impose such onerous regulations that, in
effect, they could regulate them out of existence? The 1980s was a decade of
conflict where the faith of churches in starting religious schools was severe-
ly tested. Contrary to Meyer, Pierce, Earrington, and Yoder, none of these
cases reached the Supreme Court, and most were litigated in state courts.
The first important case was State v. Whisner (1976) wherein the State of
Ohio sought to impose on a church-controlled religious school 400 standards
and guidelines that ostensibly were required of all public schools. The attor-
ney in Whisner was William Ball, the attorney who successfully argued Yoder
before the Supreme Court. In an approach not unlike the one that he took in
Yoder, Ball developed a similar coercion argument to demonstrate the suffo-
cating effect the 400 standards and guidelines would have had on the church's
ability to operate its school. Among the standards that church officials object-
ed to were those specifying the courses to be taught and the amount of
instructional time to be spent on the courses, leaving no time for religious
instruction, and those that required nonpublic schools to participate in "coop-
erative assessment of community needs," even though the school refused to
"seek its direction from the world or from the community it serves" (pp. 762-
763). The school had drawn "lines of separation from the world" that includ-
ed no drinking and card playing (p. 754).
In finding for the religious school, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
the standards were so pervasive and all-encompassing that total compliance
"would effectively eradicate the distinction between public and nonpublic
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education" (State v. Whisner, 1976, p. 768). By regulating "the content of the
curriculum that is taught, the manner in which it is taught, the person or per-
sons who teach it, the physical layout of the building in which the students
are taught, the hours of instruction and the educational policies intended to be
achieved," the effect would be "to obliterate the philosophy of the school and
impose that of the state" (p. 770).
Most of the cases involving religious schools did not involve large num-
bers of regulations. The most frequently litigated state regulation concemed
teacher certification requirements. When only one regulation was at issue,
state courts were more likely to find against the schools. State v. Faith Baptist
Church of Louisville (1981) represents the persistent and overreaching effort
by a state to compel compliance with its regulations. Here a church operated
a religious school on its premises. When school officials refused to fumish
the names of students and their parents to the state department of education,
to request approval for its religiously based instructional program, and to hire
accredited teachers, the State of Nebraska padlocked the church door. The
doors were opened only for Sunday and Wednesday evening services. The
Supreme Court of Nebraska held for the State, deciding that the teacher cer-
tification requirement that teachers have a baccalaureate degree was "neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable" {State v. Faith Baptist, p. 579). In addition, the
court upheld jailing of the pastor, who was also the school's administrator, on
two occasions for contempt for continuing to operate the school {Siliven v.
Tesch, 1982).
In a similar dispute. State v. North Platte Baptist Church (1985), a pastor
was incarcerated from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. each day and fined $200 daily for con-
tempt for continuing to operate a church school. Eventually, 2 years later, the
pastor's accumulated $19,000 in fines was reversed on procedural grounds
{State V. North Platte, 1987), but by then both the church and its religious
school had suffered from the prolonged intrusion by the state.
By the end of the 1990s, most states had moderated their requirements
for religious schools so that they could operate with minimal control by state
departments of education. The result was that religious schools and the
churches that operated them had considerable autonomy over their instruc-
tional functions. This autonomy presents a conflict as to whether religious
schools will participate in voucher programs because educators in these
schools fear that "control follows the dollar," meaning that if the state pro-
vides resources, it will want to direct how they are used.
VOUCHERS AND SCHOOL CHOICE
The voucher plan challenged in Zelman offered 4,000 vouchers, now
increased to almost 5,500, to poor students. Very probably, the parent demand
for these 5,500 vouchers will be as over-subscribed as it had been for the
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original 4,000. The question is whether parents will have enough schools,
particularly religious ones, to choose from. Now that vouchers are constitu-
tional, at least in Ohio under both federal and state constitutions, the problem
may end up being on the supply side rather than on the demand side. Since
religious schools have been by far the primary participants in the Cleveland
voucher program (46 of 56 private schools were religious enrolling 96% of
students), the issue is whether the supply of religious school spaces will
increase to accommodate the demand. Yet, in light of the litigation reviewed
earlier in this article, one can suggest several reasons why some religious
schools may not want to participate. Among those reasons are concerns about
state action, a school's mission, and church governance.
STATE ACTION
Fear about government intrusion focuses on Section 1983 damages
claims against religious schools grounded in state action. Section 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 is an expansive federal statute which provides that
"every person who, under color of any [law] of any State...[deprives another
person] of any rights...secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to
the person injured" (1994). Under Section 1983, the critical issue for reli-
gious schools is whether they can be considered as operating under color of
state law.
A line of cases dating back to the leading Supreme Court's decision in
Rendall-Baker v. Kohn (1982) has agreed that a wide range of contacts
between religious schools and the state are not sufficient to invoke state
action under one or more legal theories: state entanglement, public function,
and symbiotic relationship (Mawdsley, 2000). However, the Supreme Court
recently, in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee School Athletic Association,
(2001), introduced a less stringent theory, referred to as entwinement, to find
state action. In the first posi-BrentH'ood federal circuit court of appeals deci-
sion involving state action, Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine Central Institute,
(2002), the First Circuit held that a public school board's providing tuition to
place a student in a private school was not sufficient to constitute state action.
When the student was suspended, the parents sued for due process violations
under several state action theories. Although a two-judge majority agreed that
there was no state action, one member of the panel, in a strong dissent, argued
that school officials should have been liable for damages under the Supreme
Court's more lenient entwinement theory. One must await future litigation to
determine whether constitutional rights for students and employees will be
applicable to religious schools under the more relaxed entwinement theory
based on reception of state financial assistance. Under an approach advanced
by the dissent in Logiodice, it is possible that one such form of state financial
assistance that might bring religious schools into the ambit of state control is
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publicly funded vouchers. Thus, the interpretation of state action appears to
be in transition. If so, some religious schools may not be willing to partici-
pate in a voucher program that might bring constitutional rights into the
school and subject it to damages for violation of those rights.
SCHOOL MISSION
Religious schools differ as to their indoctrination functions with regard to
students. To the extent that a school's mission requires all students to partic-
ipate in the religious activities of the school, the Ohio statutory provisions
pertaining to vouchers suggest some problems.
Two statutory provisions may present challenges for schools that desire
to present their religious beliefs to all students and require uniform student
participation. One provision provides that the school not "discriminate on the
basis of...religion" (Ohio Rev. Code, sec. 3313.976 (A)(4) (2002)). A second
provides that a school cannot "teach hatred of any person or group on the
basis of...religion" (Ohio Rev. Code Sec. 3313.976 (A)(7) (2002)). Would a
religious school discriminate on the basis of religion if it requires its students
not of its faith to participate in religious activities, such as chapel and religion
classes? Further, would a religious school demonstrate hatred toward a reli-
gion if, in the course of classroom instruction or liturgical preaching, teach-
ers or clergy refer to the errant beliefs of other religious faiths?
The meaning of these two statutory provisions has not been tested in
Ohio. Yet, schools that have a strong indoctrination mission may choose not
to participate in vouchers because they are not willing to dilute or overlook
their mission. Even if a court were eventually to find no statutory violations,
the schools may not be willing to endure the time, energy, and expense of the
litigation to reach that result when they can simply choose not to participate
in the program.
GOVERNANCE
Most religious schools have church affiliations that frequently involve vary-
ing degrees of commitments to the religious beliefs of the host churches. As
a result, most churches exert a fair amount of govemance over the schools. In
many cases, churches underwrite facility and personnel costs that permit the
schools to keep tuition costs relatively low. When considering participation in
a state voucher program, the cost of tuition is important since, at least under
the Ohio program, the maximum amount available is 90% of $2,500, or
$2,250. This relatively low dollar amount helps explain why 96% of the
voucher students in Cleveland attended religious schools as opposed to other
nonpublic schools.
The Ohio voucher statute suggests that a church's govemance role over
its school might be affected by the provisions discussed in the previous sec-
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tion. Churches that exert a close and direct governance of their schools may
find the statute an interference with that degree of control. Although the
statute does not facially create parents' rights, it does provide for limitations
on church control over the religious practices in the school, ostensibly by per-
mitting parents to complain about "discrimination" or "hatred."
For churches that place great stock in their control over the religious
beliefs and practices of their schools, the notion that the schools may be sub-
jected to statutorily-imposed restrictions will deter some churches from per-
mitting their schools to participate in vouchers. However worthy the purpose
of vouchers in giving access by parents to school choice, that choice will not
be permitted to interfere with church control over their schools.
CONCLUSION
The Ohio voucher program tested in Zelman exposes an anomaly about
parental rights to direct their children's education. No religious school would
dispute that parents are the greatest single influence over their children's lives
and that a parent's right to direct his or her children's education must include
a right of educational choice. However, for many religious schools, that right
of parental choice cannot come at the expense of the religious integrity of the
schools and their host churches. Religious churches and schools have fought
hard to preserve their autonomy from the state and are not likely to give that
up, even if it means denying parents access to their schools under state vouch-
er programs.
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